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I. INTRODUCTION
For three decades, two issues have dominated discussions within
the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”): the persistence of
the moratorium on commercial whaling 1 and Japan’s scientific
research whaling 2 under the International Convention for the
1. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. XI, ¶ 10, Dec.
2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter ICRW]. The Schedule is an integral part of the ICRW. Id. art. I(1).
The Schedule was last amended at the 65th Annual Meeting of the IWC in
September 2014. At the moment, however, the IWC’s website only provides a link
to the Schedule as amended in 2012. See International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, Schedule art. III, ¶ 10(e), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161
U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter Schedule]. The 2014 amendments can be found in Int’l
Whaling Comm’n [IWC], Summary of Main Outcomes, Decisions and Required
Actions from the 65th Meeting, at 6 (Sept. 18, 2014), available at http://iwc.int/iwc
65docs [hereinafter Summary of Main Outcomes].
2. Between 1987 and 2001, the IWC has condemned Japan’s so-called
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Regulation of Whaling (“ICRW”). 3 Indeed, Japan’s scientific
research whaling has led, uniquely, to a television show (Whale
Wars) documenting the efforts of the Sea Shepherd Conservation
Society to stop Japanese scientific research whaling in Antarctica, 4
an episode of South Park, 5 and a decision of the International Court
of Justice, which ruled in March 2014 that Japan’s Antarctic whaling
was not for purposes of scientific research. 6
Recently, however, a third issue has created controversy:
aboriginal subsistence whaling (“ASW”) and, in particular,
scientific whaling for failing to meet the criteria for scientific whaling and the
IWC’s Scientific Committee has stated that Japan’s scientific whaling does not
provide data relevant to any critically important management purpose. See, e.g.,
IWC, Resolution on Whaling Under Special Permit in the North Pacific Ocean,
IWC Res. 2000-5 (2000); IWC, Resolution on Whaling Under Special Permit in
the Southern Ocean Sanctuary, IWC Res. 2000-5 (2000); IWC, Resolution on
Whaling Under Special Permit, IWC Res. 1998-4 (1998); IWC, Resolution on
Special Permit Catches in the North Pacific by Japan, IWC Res. 1997-6 (1997);
IWC, Resolution on Special Permit Catches in the Southern Ocean by Japan, IWC
Res. 1997-5 (1997); IWC, Resolution on Special Permit Catches by Japan, IWC
Res. 1996-7 (1996); IWC, Resolution on Special Permit Catches by Japan in the
Southern Hemisphere, IWC Res. 1994-10 (1994); IWC, Resolution on Special
Permit Catches by Norway, IWC Res. 1994-11 (1994); IWC, Resolution on
Special Permit Catches by Japan in the Southern Hemisphere, IWC Res. 1993-7
(1993); IWC, Resolution on Special Permit Catches by Japan in the Southern
Hemisphere, IWC Res. 1991- App’x 2 (1991); IWC, Resolution on Special Permit
Catches by Japan in the Southern Hemisphere, IWC Res. 1990-2 (1990);
IWC, Resolution on the Proposed Take by Japan of Whales in the Southern
Hemisphere Under Special Permit, IWC Res. 1989-3 (1989); IWC, Resolution on
Japanese Proposal for Special Permits, IWC Res. 1987-4 (1987); see also Petition
to Certify Japan Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 1978 for Trading in the Meat of Minke,
Bryde’s, and Sperm Whales from the North Pacific and the Southern Hemisphere
(Nov. 14, 2000), available at http://law.lclark.edu/clinics/international_
environmental_law_project/ our_work/ whaling (discussing the aforementioned
IWC resolutions).
3. ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIII.
4. About Whale Wars, ANIMAL PLANET (July 13, 2012), http://www.animal
planet.com/tv-shows/whale-wars/about-this-show/about-whale-wars.
5. South Park: Whale Whores (Comedy Central television broadcast Oct. 28,
2009). In truth, the South Park episode, Whale Whores, is a satirical look at the
efforts and members of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and its show Whale
Wars, which has been broadcast on Animal Planet for several years.
6. See Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan), 2014 I.C.J. 148, ¶¶ 35-37
(Mar. 31); see also Cymie R. Payne, Australia v. Japan: ICJ Halts Antarctic
Whaling, 18 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L., no. 9, 2014, available at http://www.asil.org/
insights/volume/18/issue/9/australia-v-japan-icj-halts-antarctic-whaling (criticizing
the ICJ’s decision).
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Greenland’s ASW. Since 1985, a large number of whales have been
killed pursuant to ASW—more than 9,700 7—compared to 16,039
killed pursuant to scientific research whaling permits 8 and 23,484
whales killed for commercial purposes. 9 The ICRW’s regulations
require that the number of whales killed for aboriginal subsistence
align with subsistence needs; national governments are responsible
for providing the IWC with evidence of the cultural, nutritional, and
subsistence needs of their people. 10 The IWC’s Scientific Committee
makes recommendations on quotas for the stocks, 11 and the IWC
adopts catch limits, more commonly called quotas, based on the
Scientific Committee’s recommendations and the advice of the
IWC’s ASW sub-committee. Since 1997, the IWC has set ASW
quotas in five-year blocks, 12 although it now sets them in six-year
blocks. 13
While the IWC has long recognized the importance of ASW for
certain aboriginal groups, the approval of ASW quotas has
sometimes met resistance. For example, the IWC has challenged
Greenland’s request for fin and humpback whales 14 as well as the
7. Catches
Taken:
ASW,
INT’L WHALING
COMM’N
(2014),
http://iwc.int/table_aboriginal. Under current IWC regulations, aboriginal groups
in Greenland, the Russia Federation, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the
United States may hunt whales. Catch Limits & Catches Taken, INT’L WHALING
COMM’N (2014), http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=html_76#aborig.
8. Catches Taken: Special Permit, INT’L WHALING COMM’N (2014),
http://iwc.int/table_permit.
9. Catches Taken: Under Observation or Under Reservation, INT’L WHALING
COMM’N (2014), http://iwc.int/table_objection.
10. See Schedule, supra note 1, ¶ 13(a).
11. Id. ¶ 13(a)(3) (“The above provisions will be kept under review, based
upon the best scientific advice.”).
12. See Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, WHALE &DOLPHIN CONSERVATION,
http://us.whales.org/issues/aboriginal-subsistence-whaling (last visited Jan. 31,
2015).
13. Because the IWC now meets every two years instead of every year, it
changed ASW quotas from five-year blocks to six-year blocks in 2012. See IWC,
Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2012, at 19 (2013)
[hereinafter IWC Annual Report 2012] (discussing ASW quotas for bowhead, gray,
and humpback whales and the move from five-year to six-year quotas).
14. In 2008, the IWC rejected Greenland’s proposal to add humpback whales
to its ASW quota. IWC, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission
2009, at 22-23 (2010). In 2010, Greenland’s ASW quota was approved only after
Greenland agreed to reduce the number of fin whales and humpback whales killed
for aboriginal subsistence purposes in its proposal. IWC, Annual Report of the
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taking of humpback whales by individuals in St. Vincent and the
Grenadines. 15 However, the ASW debate significantly intensified in
2012 when the IWC rejected Greenland’s request for an ASW quota
starting with the 2013 season. 16 IWC members expressed concerns
over the size of the quota, Greenland’s conversion factors used to
calculate the yield of meat from each whale, and evidence of the
commercial sale of whale meat in restaurants. 17 According to a recent
large-scale study of consumption patterns in Greenland, Greenland’s
Inuit consume approximately ten kilograms of cetacean meat per
capita per year (including meat from thousands of small cetaceans,
such as belugas, narwhals, and killer whales, killed each year). 18 This
is considerably less than twelve to thirteen kilograms of whale meat
from large whales (bowhead, fin, humpback, and minke) alone that
Greenland claimed in its 2012 needs statement 19 and the fifteen
kilograms it claimed in its 2014 need statement. 20
Despite the IWC’s rejection of its ASW request, Greenland
unilaterally established an ASW quota for 2013 and 2014.21
International Whaling Commission 2010, at 17 (2011).
15. A frequent concern of the IWC is the ongoing killing of what many
consider to be calves by those engaged in ASW in St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
See, e.g., IWC, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2000, at
18 (2001) [hereinafter IWC Annual Report 2000]; see also WHALE & DOLPHIN
CONSERVATION SOC’Y, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORTS OF THE IWC’S INFRACTION
SUB-COMMITTEE FROM 1991 TO 2004: REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE AT THE
IWC (2005) (reviewing the history of attempts to label this killing as an
infraction).
16. See Press Release, Int’l Whaling Comm’n (2012), available at
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3476&search=press%2C+release&orde
r_by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=0 (discussing the
impasse within the IWC over Greenland with a vote of twenty-five to thirty-four
with three abstentions).
17. See IWC Annual Report 2012, supra note 13, at 22 (describing concern
from Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina over Greenland’s ASW whaling practices).
18. Charlotte Jeppesen et al., Assessment of Consumption of Marine Food in
Greenland by a Food Frequency Questionnaire and Biomarkers, INT’L J. OF
CIRCUMPOLAR HEALTH, May 2012, at 4 (May 17, 2012).
19. IWC, White Paper on Management and Utilization of Large Whales in
Greenland, May 2012 3 (White Paper Supp. IWC/64/ASW 8, 2012), available at
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/search.php?search=!collection84.
20. IWC, Utilization of Large Whales in Greenland: A Need Statement, at 13,
IWC/65/17 (July 2014).
21. See PS, Whale Quotas Create Rift Between Greenland and Denmark,
COPENHAGEN POST (July 11, 2013), http://cphpost.dk/news/whale-quotas-createrift-between-greenland-and-denmark.5962.html. Prior to establishing its unilateral
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Australia, 22 Denmark, 23 other IWC members, 24 and conservationists 25
argued that the IWC’s rejection of Greenland’s ASW quota
precludes Greenland from conducting ASW in 2013 and beyond
until the IWC approves a new quota. Nonetheless, Greenland
allowed the hunt. The United States, 26 St. Lucia, 27 and the Alaska
quota, Greenland solicited comments from IWC Members on its proposal to
allocate ASW quotas to itself for 2013 and 2014, without IWC approval. Letter
from Jens K. Lyberth, Greenland Deputy Minister, Ministry of Fisheries, Hunting,
and Agric., to IWC Comm’rs, Regarding Greenland Quotas on Large Whales
(Nov. 30, 2012).
22. Letter from Donna Petrachenko, Austl.’s Comm’r to the IWC, to Gitte
Hundahl, Den.’s Comm’r to the IWC (Dec. 17, 2012), available at
iwc.int/document_3159.download (objecting to Greenland’s proposal).
23. PS, supra note 21 (reporting that “[t]he Danish government argues that by
setting its own independent quota, Greenland is contravening IWC regulations”).
Denmark also said that it would have to withdraw from the IWC as a result of
Greenland’s ASW hunt. Id.
24. On behalf of EU IWC Commissioners from EU member States, the IWC
Commissioner for Cyprus wrote:
Cyprus had already expressed, on behalf of the above-listed EU IWC Commissioners,
the coordinated position on the proposal submitted by Denmark (Greenland) at IWC
64 Panama, in July of this year. As we had stated on that occasion, we were ready to
support a roll-over proposal from Greenland, just as we supported the other, joint,
proposal submitted by the USA, Russia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. At this
stage, I am compelled to inform you that this position remains unaltered and that,
consequently, we remain unable to support your suggested approach. We would also
be interested to understand how you, together with the Government of Denmark,
would see the next steps unfolding, particularly in light of the IWC Rules of Procedure
and the possibility of making use of IWC Rule E.4, considering that the next IWC
meeting will take place in 2014.

Letter from Myroula Hadjichristoforou, IWC Comm’r to Cyprus, to Minister
Lyberth (Dec. 14, 2012) (on file with author); see also 2014 IWC 65 Meeting in
Slovenia, ANIMAL WELFARE INST., https://awionline.org/content/2014-iwc-65meeting-slovenia (last visited Jan. 20, 2015) (providing that at the IWC’s 2014
meeting, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and other members of the Latin American
group of countries known as the Buenos Aires Group stated that Denmark’s failure
to report Greenland’s ASW as commercial whaling constituted an infraction).
25. The letter is signed on behalf of the Animal Welfare Institute and nineteen
other organizations. Letter from Susan Millward, Exec. Dir., Animal Welfare Inst.,
to Villy Søvndal, Den.’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mar. 4, 2013).
26. In an email, the U.S. Acting IWC Commissioner said the following:
Denmark/Greenland is now considering issuing catch limits for the years 2013 and
2014 at the same levels that Denmark proposed in Panama. The United States
supports catch limits that are consistent with a documented needs statement and that
are supported by advice of the IWC Scientific Committee. If Denmark/Greenland were
to issue catch limits for 2013 and 2014 at the same levels as their 2012 catch limits, it
would likely garner wider support within the IWC and create a more positive
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Eskimo Whaling Commission (“AEWC”) 28 have supported
Greenland’s actions, with the AEWC arguing that paragraph 13 of
the ICRW Schedule 29 allows Greenland and others to conduct ASW
hunts in the absence of an IWC-approved quota. The IWC approved
an ASW quota for Greenland at its 2014 meeting 30 that differed from
its 2012 proposal by just twelve minke whales. 31 Nonetheless, the
controversy has not subsided. At the 2014 meeting, Argentina,
atmosphere at IWC65. Further, we support Denmark/Greenland’s intention to propose
a new schedule amendment to the IWC in 2014 for catch limits through 2018.

E-mail from Ryan Wulff, Acting U.S. IWC Comm’r, to Gitte Hundaul, Den.’s
Comm’r to the IWC, and Greenland Deputy Minister Lyberth (Dec. 14, 2012) (on
file with author); see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR ISSUING ANNUAL QUOTAS TO THE ALASKA ESKIMO
WHALING COMMISSION FOR A SUBSISTENCE HUNT ON BOWHEAD WHALES FOR THE
YEARS 2013 THROUGH 2017/2018 7 (2012) (“It is possible that the IWC might not
update the catch limit, notwithstanding IWC Scientific Committee management
advice that the hunt is sustainable. If so, it should be noted that NOAA is
considering issuing annual quotas for the time periods described in the Alternatives
under the current IWC Schedule language”).
27. At the IWC’s 2012 meeting and as reported in the Chairman’s report, St.
Lucia noted:
that the proposed Schedule amendment had not been for a zero quota, but instead was
for a specific quota. Given that the previous quota was expired, it commented that
what the Commission had actually said to Denmark/Greenland was to go forth and
manage their fishery on their own. It considered that whaling would continue despite
the outcome of the vote because the outcome effectively meant no quota advice was
given.

IWC Annual Report 2012, supra note 13, at 36.
28. Letter from Johnny Aiken, Exec. Dir., Alaska Eskimo Whaling Comm’n,
to Douglas P. DeMaster, U.S. IWC Comm’r (Aug. 31, 2012) [hereinafter AEWC
Letter]. The AEWC comprises “members of Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission
are the registered whaling captains and their crew members of the eleven whaling
communities of the Arctic Alaska coast. Our Whaling Villages, ALASKA ESKIMO
WHALING COMM’N, http://aewc-alaska.com/Our_Whaling_Villages.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2015).
29. Schedule, supra note 1, ¶ 13.
30. Summary of Main Outcomes, supra note 1, at 6 (amending the Schedule to
allow aboriginal subsistence whaling). The schedule amendment for Greenland’s
quota achieved the necessary three-fourths majority with forty-six members voting
“yes,” eleven members voting “no”, and three members abstaining. IWC, Status of
Agenda Items at IWC/65 as of Monday, 15 September 2014, at 1-2, IWC/65/Status
(2014), available at https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3577.
31. See IWC, Proposed Schedule Amendment (IWC 64), at 1, IWC/64/12
(2012) (providing that the number of minke whales struck from the Central stock
and West Greenland stock shall not exceed twelve and 178 respectively for the
years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018).
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supported by Mexico, Australia, and other IWC members called on
the IWC to designate Greenland’s whaling as an infraction. 32 If
Greenland’s ASW for 2013 and 2014 constitutes an infraction, then
Denmark, which ratified the ICRW on Greenland’s behalf, 33 must
punish and prosecute those engaged in the whaling. 34 Denmark has
so far resisted these efforts. 35
Based on the ordinary meaning of paragraph 13 of the Schedule,
this article concludes that the ICRW does not establish a right for
Greenland (or any other IWC member) to conduct ASW hunts in the
absence of an IWC-adopted quota. Moreover, Greenland’s
subsequent hunt conducted without the required IWC approved ASW
quota constitutes an infraction, either as unauthorized ASW or as
whaling in violation of the moratorium on commercial whaling. As
the International Court of Justice noted in Whaling in the Antarctic, 36
only three types of whaling exist: scientific research whaling,
32. IWC, Report of the Infractions Sub-Committee, at 2, IWC/65/Rep04 (Sept.
11, 2014), available at https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3580
[hereinafter IWC Report of the Infractions Sub-Committee].
33. Greenland is an autonomous territory within Denmark. When Denmark
ratified the ICRW, it did so implicitly on behalf of Greenland. Denmark’s
instrument of ratification does not explicitly state that Denmark is ratifying on
behalf of Greenland. See Email from Francis J. Holleran, Depositary Officer, U.S.
Department of State, to Chris Wold, Assoc. Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law
School (Sept. 15, 2006) (on file with author) (providing the English translation of
the Declaration of the Kingdom of Denmark of Accession to the International
Convention on the Regulation of Whaling). However, Lord McNair, a renowned
international law scholar, has stated that when a treaty does not include a territorial
application clause, “the treaty applies to all the territory of the Contracting Party,
whether metropolitan or not” unless a government expressly indicates otherwise.
LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 117 (1961). This rule was codified in the
Vienna Convention, which states that “unless a different intention appears from the
treaty or is otherwise established, the application of a treaty extends to the entire
territory of each party.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 29, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]. As the ICRW does not include any provisions for applying the
convention to territories, the general rule applies.
34. ICRW, supra note 1, art. IX (requiring prosecution over infractions by the
“government having jurisdiction over the offense” and a requirement to report
infractions and actions taken to the IWC).
35. See IWC Report of the Infractions Sub-Committee, supra note 32, at 2
(detailing Denmark’s view that Greenland’s infraction is not exceptional enough to
warrant investigation and punishment, but that a balance struck between the ICRW
requirements and Greenland’s ASW needs should be struck).
36. 2014 I.C.J. 148 (Mar. 31).
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commercial whaling, and aboriginal subsistence whaling. 37 Since
Japan’s whaling did not constitute scientific research whaling, it
constituted commercial whaling, 38 as it was not for aboriginal
subsistence. Similarly, since Greenland has not hunted consistently
with paragraph 13 of the Schedule (and its whaling cannot be
considered to be for purposes of scientific research), then its whaling
must be either commercial in violation of paragraph 10(e) of the
Schedule or unauthorized ASW in violation of paragraph 13 of the
Schedule. Consequently, it should be recorded as an infraction by the
IWC and Denmark must take action, pursuant to article IX of the
ICRW, to punish and prosecute those involved in Greenland’s ASW.
Although paragraph 13 of the Schedule provides that ASW quotas
“shall be established” and states that taking of whales for ASW “is
permitted,” 39 it also establishes clearly articulated conditions that
must be met prior to approval of an ASW quota. In addition, the
long-standing practice of the relevant States and the IWC supports
the position that IWC-approved quotas are necessary to conduct
ASW hunts. Indeed, since the IWC adopted the current language and
structure of paragraph 13, no IWC member has ever allowed ASW in
the absence of an IWC-approved quota—until Greenland did so in
2013 and 2014. The reasons are obvious; if governments were able to
set their own quotas under national legislation, they would
undermine the IWC’s management scheme.
Finally, rules of logic support the view that paragraph 13 requires
the IWC to approve an ASW quota only after it has determined that
all the relevant conditions of paragraph 13 have been met. If
paragraph 13 establishes a right to ASW, then the role of the IWC
would only be to limit ASW quotas of IWC members rather than to
authorize ASW quotas. Under these circumstances, it is illogical that
an IWC member would need to submit an application to limit its
ASW based on subsistence need. Instead, the long-standing practice
of the IWC has been to require members to submit an application
that demonstrates the subsistence need for an ASW quota, which the

37. See id. at 148, ¶¶ 229-30 (finding that the Schedule does not allow for
definitions of whaling outside of the definitions provided in article VIII of the
ICRW).
38. Id. ¶ 231.
39. AEWC Letter, supra note 28.

570

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[30:3

IWC then accepts based on consensus or votes to either approve or
reject.
Section II of this article begins by briefly introducing the ICRW.
Section III provides a history of ASW in the IWC and parses the
provisions of the Schedule relating to ASW. Section IV applies rules
of treaty interpretation found in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties to specific arguments made by those supporting the right
of Greenland to establish ASW quotas unilaterally. Section V
assesses a range of other evidence, including the practice of relevant
IWC members that supports the conclusion that the IWC must
approve ASW quotas and that IWC members may not unilaterally
establish such quotas. Section VI explains that Greenland’s
unauthorized ASW in 2013 and 2014 constitutes an infraction.
Section VII concludes that Denmark, by virtue of its relationship
with Greenland, has acted inconsistently with the ICRW and its
Schedule by allowing Greenland to conduct ASW in 2013 and 2014
in the absence of an IWC-approved quota and by failing to report
Greenland’s hunt as an infraction.

II. SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE ICRW
The ICRW establishes two objectives: the conservation of whales
and the orderly development of a whaling industry. 40 The ICRW
itself establishes few rules to achieve those goals. Instead, it creates a
commission, the IWC, 41 with the authority to adopt binding
regulations “with respect to the conservation and utilization of whale
resources.” 42 These regulations may relate to a wide variety of
matters, including protected and unprotected species; open and
closed seasons; open and closed waters; size limits; and time,
methods, and intensity of whaling. 43 These regulations, which must
be adopted by a three-fourths majority of IWC members, 44 are
included in the ICRW’s Schedule. The IWC’s Scientific Committee
provides scientific and technical advice to the IWC. 45
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
Id. art. III(1).
Id. art. V(1).
Id.
Id. art. III(2).
Greg Donovan & Phil Hammond, Scientific Committee Handbook, INT’L
WHALING COMM’N (2014), http://iwc.int/scientific-committee-handbook (stating
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IWC members may opt out of regulations through an objection 46
or reservation. 47 The ICRW expressly allows objections, provided
that an IWC member does so within ninety days of receiving
notification of the amendment to the Schedule. 48 The ICRW does not
explicitly allow reservations when ratifying or acceding to the
convention, but it does not preclude them. 49 IWC members have only
sparingly taken objections and reservations, although when they do
they have been controversial. For example, despite the moratorium
on commercial whaling, 50 Norway hunts whales commercially
pursuant to an objection, 51 killing at least 729 minke whales in
2014. 52 Iceland hunts whales pursuant to a reservation. 53 Iceland,
although it voted against the moratorium, did not file an objection to
the decision, eventually ceased whaling, and withdrew from the

that the IWC established the Scientific Committee in 1950).
46. Under the ICRW, an amendment “shall not become effective with respect
to any Government which has so objected until such date as the objection is
withdrawn.” ICRW, supra note 1, art. V(3).
47. A reservation is “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made
by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of
the treaty in their application to that State.” Vienna Convention, supra note 33,
arts. 2(1)(d), 19.
48. ICRW, supra note 1, art. V(3).
49. The Vienna Convention provides:
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the
reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not failing under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 19.
50. Schedule, supra note 1, art. III, ¶ 10(e).
51. Id. art. III, ¶ 10(e) n.* (providing that the “[g]overnments of Japan,
Norway, Peru and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics lodged objection[s]” to
art. III, ¶ 10(e) of the Schedule).
52. Barbro Andersen & Sigurd Steinum, 729 Hval Skutt Under den Beste
Sesongen Siden 1993, NORDLAND JOUNALIST (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.nrk.no/
nordland/arets-gode-hvalsesong-er-over-1.11887970.
53. Schedule, supra note 1, art. III, ¶ 10(e) n.• (referring to Iceland’s
instrument of adherence deposited on October 10, 2002 that states Iceland “adheres
to the aforesaid Convention and Protocol with a reservation with respect to
paragraph 10(e) of the Schedule attached to the Convention”).
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ICRW in 1992. 54 It acceded to the ICRW and rejoined the IWC in
2002. 55 Because the ninety-day period for entering objections had
expired, Iceland filed a reservation to the commercial ban, which
many consider to be invalid. 56 Iceland then resumed full-scale
commercial whaling in 2006. 57 Japan hunts whales pursuant to the
ICRW’s provision for scientific research whaling. 58
Over time, the IWC has established an array of binding
regulations. These include, for example, the creation of the Southern
Ocean Sanctuary, 59 catch limits,60 size limits,61 restrictions on the
types of harpoons that can be used, 62 and aboriginal subsistence
whaling. 63 Paragraph 10 of the Schedule classifies whale stocks into
three categories and sets quotas based on the maximum sustained
yield (“MSY”) target for that category. 64 Since the 1985/1986
whaling season, catch limits for all stocks for commercial purposes
have been set to zero, unless otherwise specified in the tables of
54. Iceland and Commercial Whaling, INT’L WHALING COMM’N (2014),
http://iwc.int/iceland.
55. Id.
56. Iceland’s reservation has been particularly controversial, with several IWC
members lodging objections to it. Schedule, supra note 1, art. III, ¶ 10(e) n.#
(reporting objections to Iceland’s reservation by Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Peru, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States). One reason that Iceland’s reservation is so controversial is that Iceland cast
the decisive vote to approve it, a decision that many regard as fundamentally
flawed. See Chris Wold, Implementation of Reservations Law in International
Environmental Treaties: The Cases of Cuba and Iceland, 14 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 53, 91 (2003).
57. See Catches Taken: Under Observation or Under Reservation, supra note
9 (revealing that Iceland caught seven fin whales and one minke that year).
58. See ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIII (allowing governments to provide
scientific research permits to nationals for whaling and providing reporting
requirements for said permits).
59. Schedule, supra note 1, art. III ¶ 7(b) (designating coordinates for the
perimeter of the “Southern Ocean Sanctuary”).
60. Id. ¶ 10(e) (setting the catch limits for commercial purposes to zero).
61. Id. ¶¶ 15, 18 (establishing size limits that protect smaller, younger whales
for several species).
62. Id. ¶ 6 (forbidding use of the “cold grenade harpoon” for many commercial
whaling purposes).
63. Id. ¶ 13 (creating standards for ASW whaling based on aboriginal needs
and maximum sustainable yields).
64. Id. ¶¶ 10(a)-(c) (outlining the following categories: Sustained Management
Stock, Initial Management Stock, and Protection Stock).
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paragraph 10 of the Schedule. 65 The only whale stock that has a catch
limit listed in the tables is the West Greenland stock of fin whales,
which sets sixteen animals as the maximum number that may be
struck. 66 The footnotes indicate that this number is available to be
struck by aborigines pursuant to paragraph 13(b)(3), 67 which includes
the provisions for Greenlanders to hunt these whales for aboriginal
subsistence.

III.THE ICRW’S PROVISIONS RELATING TO ASW
As with other aspects of whaling, the ICRW itself does not include
provisions relating to ASW. However, concerns relating to ASW
formed an important part of the negotiations relating to the ICRW,
concerns which continue to form a critical part of the ongoing work
of the IWC.

A. ASW IN THE ICRW’S EARLY YEARS
During the final negotiations of the ICRW in 1946, negotiators
from Canada and the Soviet Union objected that the ICRW did not
include an exception for ASW. 68 They also made clear that
restricting aborigines to “traditional” methods, such as hunting in
canoes without firearms, was unacceptable due to challenging Arctic
conditions. 69
Negotiators responded by including a formal statement in the
ICRW’s Final Act that declares support for the continued taking of
gray whales in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, provided that the meat
and other products were used “exclusively for local consumption by
the aborigines of the Chokotsk and Korjaksk areas.” 70 They also
included a provision in the initial Schedule exempting the killing of
gray and right (also known as bowhead) whales from a whaling ban,
65. Id. ¶ 10(e).
66. Id. ¶ 1(C) (defining “strike” as “to penetrate with a weapon used for
whaling”).
67. Id. at 6 n.2.
68. See generally Michael F. Tillman, The International Management of
Aboriginal Whaling, 16 REVIEWS IN FISHERIES SCI. 437, 438 (2008) (providing an
excellent overview of the early years of ASW).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 438-39 (quoting from the Final Act of the Washington
Conference at which negotiating States adopted the ICRW).
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provided that the meat and other products were used exclusively for
local consumption by aborigines. 71 From its inception, the ICRW
recognized the important role that whale products play in the
nutritional and cultural life of some native peoples. 72 At the same
time, by limiting the purposes for and areas in which ASW could
occur, the ICRW also affirmed that the IWC could and would
regulate such whaling.
From 1948 to 1961, ASW occurred under these basic provisions.
When the IWC started limiting the killing of humpback whales, it
included a new ASW exception in 1961 to permit Greenlanders to
continue killing up to ten humpback whales annually. 73 In 1964, the
IWC amended the Schedule to allow a government to kill gray and
right whales on behalf of aborigines, provided that the meat and
other whale products were used “exclusively for local consumption
by the aborigines.” 74

B. ASW IN THE 1970S AND 1980S
ASW changed dramatically in the 1970s when the Scientific
Committee became concerned about the rising number of bowhead
whales killed by Alaskan Eskimos, as well as an alarming increase in
those whales struck by harpoons but lost (known as “struck and lost”
in IWC jargon). Whereas the average number of bowheads killed by
Alaskan Eskimos had averaged ten between 1945 and 1969, it
averaged thirty between 1970 and 1977. 75 Moreover, the number of
whales struck and lost rose from ten in 1973 to eighty-two in 1977. 76
Meanwhile, the Scientific Committee estimated that the bowhead
population had declined from a historic level between 11,700 and
18,000 to 1,300 in 1977. 77 As a consequence, the Scientific
71. Id. at 439.
72. Bowhead Whale, Qeqertarsuaq, Greenland, INT’L WHALING COMM’N
(2014), http://iwc.int/aboriginal (noting the two major objectives of IWC
regulation of ASW is to maintain healthy populations of whale and to allow
aboriginal groups to maintain cultural practices of whaling).
73. See IWC, Twelfth Report of the Commission, at 31 (1961) (finding nothing
wrong with a proposal to allow the killing of ten humpback whales for local
consumption in Greenland).
74. IWC, Sixteenth Report of the Commission, at 20-21 (1966).
75. Tillman, supra note 68, at 439.
76. Id.
77. Id. (estimating that the population of bowhead whales dropped to seven to
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Committee recommended that ASW of bowheads by Alaskan
Eskimos should cease. 78 The IWC agreed, amending the Schedule by
deleting the exception for killing right whales (i.e., bowheads) by
aborigines. 79
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the IWC began exploring a
more systematic way of regulating ASW. For example, in 1979, the
IWC asked the United States to demonstrate the nutritional, cultural,
and subsistence needs of Alaskan Eskimos for bowhead whales, 80
and the next year extended that requirement to all aboriginal hunts. 81
Although these requests were found in non-binding resolutions, the
United States and other IWC members complied with the requests. 82
As discussed below, demonstrating need later became a requirement
included in the Schedule.
The IWC also created a working group to define subsistence use
and objectives for managing whales subject to ASW. 83 That working

eleven percent of its original size by 1977). Subsequent population estimates
showed the bowhead population to be “much larger.” Randall R. Reeves, The
Origins and Character of “Aboriginal Subsistence” Whaling: A Global Review, 32
MAMMAL REV. 71, 72 (2002).
78. IWC, Twenty-Eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission, at
22 (1978) (expressing concern for both killed and “struck but lost” bowheads
likely as a result from adoption of shoulder guns instead of dart guns for hunting).
79. Id.
80. IWC, Thirtieth Report of the International Whaling Commission, at 35
(1980) (stating that the IWC would review and make a determination based on the
information provided by the United States).
81. IWC, Thirty-First Report of the International Whaling Commission, at 29
(1981) (“[A]ll Contracting Governments under whose jurisdiction aboriginal/
subsistence whaling operations conducted under paragraph 12 of the Schedule
shall document annually for the information of the Commission: the utilization of
the meat and products of any whales taken for aboriginal/subsistence purposes.”).
82. See, e.g., id. at 18 (discussing the interim report submitted by the United
States in fulfillment of the resolution on the cultural, nutritional, and subsistence
needs of Eskimo populations).
83. See id. at 17 (stating that the working group would “develop appropriate
management principles and guidelines for subsistence catches”).
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group recommended the following definitions to help frame
aboriginal subsistence whaling:
Aboriginal subsistence whaling means whaling for purposes of local
consumption carried out by or on behalf of aboriginal, indigenous, or
native peoples who share strong community, familial, social, and cultural
ties related to a continuing traditional dependence on whaling and on the
use of whales.
Local aboriginal consumption means the traditional uses of whale
products by local aboriginal, indigenous, or native communities in
meeting their nutritional, subsistence, and cultural requirements. The term
includes trade in items which are by-products of subsistence catches.
Subsistence catches are catches of whales by aboriginal subsistence
whaling operations. 84

The working group’s report also noted that the use of modern
technologies to hunt whales is not inconsistent with these
definitions. 85 In fact, the use of modern technologies could be more
humane by reducing the length of time it takes for whales to die
(known as “time to death” in IWC jargon) and could have
conservation benefits by reducing the number of animals struck and
lost. The report thus recognized that cultures evolve and that the
IWC is not trying to “lock in” aboriginal cultures to some distant
point in the past. The IWC accepted the report of the working group
in a 1982 resolution, 86 but it did not include the definitions in the
Schedule.

84. IWC, Aboriginal/Subsistence Whaling (with Special Reference to the
Alaska and Greenland Fisheries), at 83 (1982) [hereinafter Aboriginal/Subsistence
Whaling].
85. See id. at 82 (agreeing that hunting techniques be “as humane as
possible”).
86. IWC, Chairman’s Report of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting, at 38
(1983) [hereinafter IWC 1982 Report].

2015]

ABORIGINAL SUBSISTENCE WHALE HUNT

577

In the same 1982 resolution, the IWC also adopted the working
group’s recommended principles for ASW:
To ensure that the risks of extinction to individual stocks are not seriously
increased by subsistence whaling;
To enable aboriginal people, to harvest whales in perpetuity at levels
appropriate to their cultural and nutritional requirements, subject to the
other objectives;
To maintain the status of whale stocks at or above the level giving the
highest net recruitment and to ensure that stocks below that level are
moved towards it so far as the environment permits. 87

Unlike the definitions, the IWC formalized these principles in
paragraph 13 of the Schedule, marking the first time that the IWC
imposed scientific requirements for ASW. At the same time, these
principles allowed ASW to increase the risks of extinction to a
species, so long as that increase is not “serious.” The IWC’s
willingness to accept this conservation risk reflects a recognition of
the cultural and nutritional needs of aboriginal peoples, as well as the
historically low numbers of whales killed in ASW relative to
commercial operations and ASW’s lack of a profit motive. 88
While one author has called the conceptual distinction between
commercial whaling and ASW “crude and ambiguous,” 89 the legal
distinction is clear: ASW occurs pursuant to paragraph 13 of the
Schedule and commercial whaling occurs pursuant to the other
provisions of the Schedule, particularly paragraph 10. In fact, while
the moratorium on commercial whaling has been in place since 1986,
the IWC has continued to review and, in most circumstances, allow
limited taking of whales for aboriginal subsistence purposes. 90
87. Aboriginal/Subsistence Whaling, supra note 84, at 84.
88. Tillman, supra note 68, at 441 (stating that the willingness of the IWC to
accept additional risks associated with ASW “apparently arises from a commonly
shared belief that, whereas commercial operations are driven by market forces to
maximize catches, aboriginal hunts tend to be self-limiting in that they only take
what is necessary to satisfy basic human needs”).
89. Reeves, supra note 77, at 77, 96-99 (reviewing various interpretations of
“aboriginal subsistence”).
90. See Schedule, supra note 1, art. III, ¶¶ 10, 13. Much more could certainly
be said concerning the history of ASW. The IWC has adopted numerous
resolutions concerning ASW for specific whale populations. ASW quotas have
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C. ASW TODAY
By incorporating the three principles for ASW in the Schedule, the
IWC seeks to ensure that ASW does not seriously increase risks of
extinction to individual whale stocks and that aboriginal people are
able to hunt whales at levels appropriate to cultural and nutritional
requirements “in perpetuity.” 91 National governments, on behalf of
an aboriginal group, must submit a “Needs Statement” that provides
evidence of the cultural, subsistence, and nutritional aspects of the
hunt, products, and distribution. 92 The IWC’s Scientific Committee
provides advice on the sustainability of proposed hunts and safe
catch limits. The IWC then considers that advice along with the
Needs Statement. 93
More specifically, paragraph 13 establishes two sets of conditions
for ASW. Paragraph 13(a) provides the first set of conditions, which
apply to ASW quotas for any stock. Paragraph 13(a) permits ASW
quotas “notwithstanding” the provisions of paragraph 10, provided
that several conditions are met. Paragraph 13(a) begins by providing
that a quota shall be established, but only (i) to satisfy the aboriginal
subsistence need, (ii) for each whaling season, and (iii) in accordance
with five additional principles. 94 These five principles relate to the
conservation status of the stock, the prohibition against striking or
killing calves or suckling calves (depending on the situation), and the
need for national legislation that accords with paragraph 13. For
example, ASW quotas must be established for those stocks at or
above MSY if removals do not exceed ninety percent of MSY; if a
stock is below MSY, then quotas are permissible if the quotas allow
the stock to move towards MSY. 95

fluctuated over the years as well. In addition, the IWC now maintains an
Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Working Group. For more on these issues, see
generally IWC Annual Report 2012, supra note 13.
91. See Aboriginal/Subsistence Whaling, supra note 84, at 84.
92. See Schedule, supra note 1, art. III, ¶ 13 (establishing whaling ASW
quotas based on data submitted by national governments on aboriginal subsistence
needs).
93. See id. (balancing maximum sustainable yields with aboriginal needs).
94. Id. ¶ 13(a).
95. Id. ¶ 13(a)(1)-(5).
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Paragraph 13(b) provides the second set of conditions. These
conditions apply to ASW quotas for specific stocks. The chapeau of
paragraph 13(b) states that “catch limits for [ASW] are as follows.” 96
Paragraphs 13(b)(1)–(4) then set out the conditions under which
ASW hunts may occur for specific whale stocks in specific years in
specific geographical regions. 97 For each stock, whale meat and other
whale products must be used solely for local consumption. 98
In addition, paragraph 13(b) establishes specific, numerical quotas
for each stock. For example, the ASW quota for bowhead whales in
the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Seas may not exceed 336 for the years
2013-2018; 99 the ASW quota for gray whales from the Eastern stock
in the North Pacific may not exceed 140 over the same period. 100
Notably, after the 2012 IWC annual meeting, the ASW quotas
applicable to Greenland (e.g., Western Greenland stock of minke
whales) did not include quotas for the 2013-2018 period. Instead, the
Schedule continued to refer to quotas applicable to the years 2010,
2011, and 2012. 101 Of course, this changed as a result of the IWC’s
2014 decision approving Greenland’s ASW quotas. 102
However, not all of the specific provisions for ASW are drafted
the same in paragraph 13(b). Paragraph 13(b)(1) is the most clearly
drafted. It states that taking of bowhead whales from the BeringChukchi-Beaufort Seas stock is permitted “but only when” the whale
products are used for local consumption by aborigines and “further
provided that” several additional conditions are met. 103 One of these
96. Id. ¶ 13(b).
97. Id. ¶ 13(b)(1)-(4).
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 13(b)(1)(i).
100. Id. ¶ 13(b)(2)(i).
101. Id. ¶ 13(b)(3).
102. See Summary of Main Outcomes, supra note 1, at 6.
103. Schedule, supra note 1, art. III, ¶ 13(b)(1) (emphasis added). The Schedule
also states:
The taking of bowhead whales from the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Seas stock by
aborigines is permitted, but only when the meat and products of such whales are to be
used exclusively for local consumption by the aborigines and further provided that:
(i) For the years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, the number of bowhead
whales landed shall not exceed 336. For each of these years the number of bowhead
whales struck shall not exceed 67, except that any unused portion of a strike quota
from any year (including 15 unused strikes from the 2008-2012 quota) shall be carried
forward and added to the strike quotas of any subsequent years, provided that no more
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additional conditions requires a quota to be granted for a specific
year; 104 another requires an annual review by the IWC in light of
evidence from the Scientific Committee. 105
Paragraph 13(b)(3) states that taking by aborigines from certain
stocks in the waters around Greenland is permitted “and then only
when” the meat is used for local consumption. Unlike paragraph
13(b)(1), however, it does not end with the phrase “and further
provided that.” Instead, paragraph 13(b)(3), as well as paragraph
(b)(2) for ASW of gray whales, comes to a full stop before adding
quotas for individual whale stocks in sub-paragraphs 13(b)(3)(i)(v). 106 Notably, the number of fin whales from the West Greenland
stock included in paragraph 13(b)(3) is sixteen, 107 consistent with
than 15 strikes shall be added to the strike quota for any one year.
(ii) This provision shall be reviewed annually by the Commission in light of the
advice of the Scientific Committee.

Id.
104. Id. ¶ 13(b)(1)(i).
105. Id. ¶ 13(b)(1)(ii).
106. Section 13(b)(2) states that:
The taking of gray whales from the Eastern stock in the North Pacific is permitted, but
only by aborigines or a Contracting Government on behalf of aborigines, and then only
when the meat and products of such whales are to be used exclusively for local
consumption by the aborigines.
(i) For the years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, the number of gray whales
taken in accordance with this sub-paragraph shall not exceed 744, provided that the
number of gray whales taken in any one of the years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
and 2018 shall not exceed 140.
(ii)This provision shall be reviewed annually by the Commission in light of the
advice of the Scientific Committee.

Id. ¶ 13(b)(2).
In contrast, section 13(b)(3) states that:
The taking by aborigines of minke whales from the West Greenland and Central
stocks and fin whales from the West Greenland stock and bowhead whales from
the West Greenland feeding aggregation and humpback whales from the West
Greenland feeding aggregation is permitted and then only when the meat and
products are to be used exclusively for local consumption.
(i) The number of fin whales struck from the West Greenland stock
(ii) The number of minke whales struck from the Central stock
(iii) The number of minke whales struck from the West Greenland stock
(iv) The number of bowhead whales struck off West Greenland
(v)The number of humpback whales struck off West Greenland

Id. ¶ 13(b)(3).
107. Id. ¶ 13(b)(3) (including the catch limit for the West Greenland stock of fin
whales in both Table 1 and in paragraph 13(b)(3) is redundant, particularly since
all other ASW catch limits have been removed from Table 1).
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Table 1 in paragraph 10. No other stocks for which quotas are set in
paragraph 13(b) have catch or strike limits set out in Table 1. Finally,
paragraph 13(b)(4) comprises just two sentences allowing humpback
quotas for the Bequians of St. Vincent and the Grenadines in specific
years for local consumption. 108
Structurally, the differences between these paragraphs are merely
cosmetic, the result of drafting these provisions over a wide span of
time, 109 and, unfortunately, bad drafting. In fact, subparagraphs
13(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) are structurally identical, except for the
use of “further provided that” in subparagraph 13(b)(1). These
similarities, especially when comparing the nearly identical language
in the paragraphs, are quite plain when one examines the texts wordby-word. 110 Functionally, these subparagraphs serve the same
purpose: to impose additional conditions for the establishment of
quotas described in the chapeau of paragraph 13(b). 111

IV.THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND THE
ORDINARY MEANING OF THE ASW PROVISIONS
Although the language of the ASW provisions is inconsistent, the
meaning of these provisions can be identified by resorting to the
rules of treaty interpretation found in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”). 112 The Vienna Convention
requires as a general rule that a treaty be interpreted “in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 113
108. Id. ¶ 13(b)(4) (“For the seasons 2013-2018 the number of humpback
whales to be taken by the Bequians of St. Vincent and The Grenadines shall not
exceed 24. The meat and products of such whales are to be used exclusively for
local consumption in St. Vincent and The Grenadines.”).
109. See IWC, Report of the Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Working Group,
at 14, IWC/64/ASW5 Rev1 (May 28, 2012) (providing an historical overview of
ASW in the IWC).
110. Compare Summary of Main Outcomes, supra note 1, ¶ 13(b)(3), and id.
¶ 13(b), with id. ¶ 13(b)(2)(i), and id. ¶¶ 13(b)(1)-(4).
111. See infra Part III.A.
112. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 31.
113. Id. art. 31(1). This textual approach to interpretation, which focuses on the
ordinary meaning of terms, has attained the status of customary international law.
Territorial Dispute Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 41 (Feb.
3) (“[I]n accordance with customary international law, reflected in Article 31 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty must be interpreted in
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The context can include, inter alia, any subsequent practice that
establishes the agreement of the parties as to the interpretation or
application of the treaty. 114 The Schedule, as amended, is an integral
part of the ICRW 115 and is therefore subject to the rules of treaty
interpretation described in the Vienna Convention. 116 As a
consequence, the Schedule must be interpreted according to the
ordinary meaning of the language, taken in context of the object and
purpose of the treaty, and in light of practical application.
As described in the following sub-sections, the ordinary meaning
of the ASW provisions, in light of the ICRW’s context, object, and
purpose, supports the conclusion that the IWC must approve ASW
quotas and that individual IWC members are not authorized to
conduct ASW unilaterally. This analysis provides a good-faith
interpretation of the treaty based on its recognized purpose “to
provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make
possible the orderly development of the whaling industry.” 117 The
inclusion of both conservation and use goals in the preamble
suggests the need for management, and thus the ICRW should be
recognized as a treaty designed to manage whale stocks by the IWC.
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose. Interpretation must be based
above al1 upon the text of the treaty.”); Competence of the General Assembly for
the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8
(Mar. 3) (“[T]he first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply
the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and
ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their
natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the
matter.”); see also 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1271-75 (Robert Jennings
& Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 2002).
114. Id. art. 31(3)(b).
115. ICRW, supra note 1, art. I, ¶ 1 (“The Schedule attached thereto which
forms an integral part thereof”).
116. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 5 (stating that the Convention
applies to any treaty that is a constituent instrument of an international
organization). Although the ICRW pre-dates the Vienna Convention, the Vienna
Convention’s basic rules on treaty interpretation, including article 31, are
considered customary international law. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 608 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that “a good number” although
not all, of the provisions of the Vienna Convention express general international
law, and those that do not “constitute presumptive evidence of emergent rules of
general international law”); IAN M. SINCLAIR, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF TREATIES 5-21 (2d ed. 1984).
117. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
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The Schedule is the mechanism by which the ICRW and IWC
establish rules for managing individual whale stocks, and the
Schedule’s provisions must be interpreted in light of this purpose.
Any interpretation must be careful not to undercut the ability of the
IWC to manage whale stocks according to all provisions of the
ICRW.
As described below, the ordinary meaning of the terms and
provisions used in the Schedule indicate that paragraph 13(a)
establishes a number of conditions that must be met before an ASW
quota may be approved. Moreover, the ordinary meaning supports
the conclusion that the IWC must determine whether the conditions
have been met and must establish ASW quotas. Paragraph 13 does
not create a right for an IWC member to conduct ASW hunts.

A. THE USE OF “NOTWITHSTANDING” IN PARAGRAPH 13
IDENTIFIES ASW AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULES OF PARAGRAPH
10
Paragraph 13(a) of the Schedule begins with the phrase
“notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 10.” The word
“notwithstanding” is widely recognized as indicating an exception to
a rule. The ordinary meaning of “notwithstanding,” defined as “in
spite of,” 118 makes that clear: “In spite of” the catch limits and other
provisions included in paragraph 10, the IWC may authorize ASW
quotas; the ASW quotas are the exception to the primary rules
established in paragraph 10. As such, paragraph 13 does not establish
an absolute right to ASW, as some have suggested. 119
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”)’s Appellate Body has
interpreted “notwithstanding” in the same manner. In a trade dispute
unrelated to the ICRW, the WTO Appellate Body concluded that use
of the term “notwithstanding” creates an exception to a general
rule. 120 It further recognized that a State could use the exception to
118. Notwithstanding Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/128667?redirectedFrom=notwithstanding#eid
(last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
119. See, e.g., AEWC Letter, supra note 28, at 2-3 (stating that the United
States “is required to issue aboriginal subsistence catch limits under the plain
language of paragraph 13 of the Schedule”).
120. The Appellate Body stated:
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deviate from the general rule only if the conditions set out in the
exception are met. 121
The structure of paragraph 13(a) and its “notwithstanding”
language closely mirror the language analyzed by the WTO
Appellate Body. In the Schedule, the general rules are provided in
paragraph 10 and paragraph 13(a) creates an exception to the general
rules. Further, the exception is triggered only when all of the
conditions set forth in paragraph 13 are met. If the conditions have
not been met, then the exception is not triggered.
Paragraph 10 reinforces this interpretation. Paragraph 10 sets out
the catch limits for each whale stock in Table 1, which are all set at
zero except for West Greenland fin whales. Although Table 1
includes a catch limit for West Greenland fin whales, that does not
suggest that ASW may take place for that stock in the absence of an
IWC-approved ASW quota because footnote 2 of Table 1 makes
catch limits for West Greenland fin whales “subject to paragraph
13(b)(3).” Thus, footnote 2 creates an express link between the catch
limits established in Table 1 and the ASW quotas established in
paragraph 13(b)(3). Consequently, the catch limit in Table 1 must
meet the same conditions under paragraph 13(a) and paragraph 13(b)
as any other ASW hunt. Even if the catch limit for fin whales
remains in Table 1, a specific quota must be granted for “each” year
under paragraph 13. Thus, without a specific ASW quota, no ASW
for West Greenland fin whales may occur. Because the IWC did not
grant a quota for West Greenland fin whales in 2013 and 2014,
Greenland was not allowed to conduct ASW unilaterally in those
years, consistent with the ICRW and the Schedule.
By using the word “notwithstanding”, paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause permits
Members to provide “differential and more favourable treatment” to developing
countries “in spite of” the MFN obligation of Article I:1. Such treatment would
otherwise be inconsistent with Article I:1 because that treatment is not extended to all
Members of the WTO “immediately and unconditionally”. Paragraph 1 thus excepts
Members from complying with the obligation contained in Article I:1 for the purpose
of providing differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries,
provided that such treatment is in accordance with the conditions set out in the
Enabling Clause. As such, the Enabling Clause operates as an “exception” to Article
I:1.

Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶ 90,WT/DSB246/AB/R (Apr. 7,
2004) (adopted Apr. 20, 2004).
121. Id.
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B. THE IWC MUST INSCRIBE AN ASW QUOTA IN PARAGRAPH
13(b) BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS INCLUDED IN
PARAGRAPH 13(a)
The AEWC argues that paragraph 13(a) can be read in isolation of
paragraph 13(b). As a result, AEWC concludes that an IWCapproved quota is not needed and that an IWC member may conduct
ASW in the absence of an IWC-approved ASW quota. 122 It achieves
this result by claiming that the subparagraphs in paragraph 13(b),
including the quotas for specified years identified in each clause (i),
are “independent of the rest” of paragraph 13(b). 123
This reading of paragraph 13 is anything but ordinary. Paragraphs
13(a) and 13(b) must be read in conjunction with each other; neither
composes the entire ASW management scheme in isolation.
Paragraph 13(a) refers to quotas with the language “catch limits for
aboriginal subsistence whaling . . . shall be established.” 124
Paragraph 13(b) mirrors this language by providing that “[c]atch
limits for aboriginal subsistence whaling are as follows.” 125 In other
words, paragraph 13(a) establishes general conditions applicable to
all ASW quotas and paragraph 13(b) establishes specific conditions
for specific whale stocks. These paragraphs complement each other.
The use of identical language in paragraphs 13(a) and 13(b)—
“[c]atch limits for aboriginal subsistence whaling”—further supports
the conclusion that paragraphs 13(a) and 13(b) must be read as one
comprehensive management scheme and that specific catch quotas,
based on the principles in paragraph 13(a), are to be inscribed in
paragraph 13(b).
Paragraph 13(a) also specifies that the conditions for establishing
ASW quotas included in paragraph 13 must be met in “each whaling
season.” This language is straightforward: in each year, a quota must
meet all the requirements of paragraph 13 and the IWC alone
inscribes ASW quotas for “each whaling season” in paragraph 13(b).
Without an ASW quota from the IWC for the 2013 and 2014
seasons, Greenland did not meet the conditions in paragraph 13(a) of
the Schedule that a “catch limit shall be established . . . [for] each
122.
123.
124.
125.

AEWC Letter, supra note 28, at 8, 10.
Id.
Schedule, supra note 1, art. III, ¶ 13(a) (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 13(b) (emphasis added).
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whaling season.” The IWC refused to set a quota for the Greenlandic
ASW hunt. The language in paragraph 13(a) requires that a quota “be
established,” which is an affirmative act by some entity. This mirrors
the requirement in paragraph 13(a)(2) that the quota is “set at levels.”
As noted previously in this section, that quota must be inscribed in
paragraph 13(b). The only way a quota may be inscribed in
paragraph 13(b) is upon a three-fourths majority vote of IWC
members. In other words, while the sentence is written in passive
voice, the unnamed entity is the IWC, because only the IWC can
adopt amendments to paragraph 13(b).

C. THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF PARAGRAPHS 13(b)(1)-(4)
SUPPORTS AN INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 13 THAT
IDENTIFIES THE IWC AS THE ENTITY TO APPROVE ASW QUOTAS
The general structure of paragraphs 13(b)(1)-(4) creates a
management scheme that requires the IWC to set quotas before ASW
may occur. The drafting of paragraph 13(b)(1) illustrates this
conclusion. The phrase “further provided that” underscores the link
between the conditions set out in paragraph 13(b)(1) and the
additional conditions set out in sub-sections 13(b)(1)(i)-(ii). The
phrase indicates that any request for ASW quotas must meet the
requirements of these sub-sections before ASW is permitted. The
Oxford English Dictionary defines “further” as “going beyond what
already exists or has been dealt with; additional, more.” 126 The
Oxford Dictionary also defines “provided that” as “with the
provision or condition (that).” 127 Taken together, the phrase “further
provided that” is clearly designed to create conditions in addition to
those included in the rest of the paragraph. Those additional
conditions appear in paragraphs 13(b)(1)(i)-(ii) and include quotas
established in specific years. When the IWC has not issued a quota
by amending 13(b)(1)(i) of the Schedule, then the conditions of
paragraph 13(b)(1) are not met and no ASW hunts may occur.
The AEWC has argued that deleting the numeric ASW quotas in
1977 for specific years in paragraph 13(b)(1)(i) for bowhead whales
126. Further Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/75715?rskey=hgPrmg&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited
Jan. 22, 2015).
127. Provided Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/153449?redirectedFrom=provided#eid (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
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would not have resulted in a zero quota. Instead, it would have
resulted in no numeric quota being set, thereby allowing a limitless
ASW hunt for bowheads. 128 By extension, the AEWC argues that the
failure of the IWC to adopt an ASW quota has the same effect.
AEWC reaches this conclusion “since clause (i) is a ‘further
provided’ clause that is independent of the rest of paragraph
13(b)(1).” 129 The AEWC’s argument is completely without merit. As
noted in the previous paragraph, the phrase “further provided that”
establishes a link between two elements; it does not sever the link. In
the case of paragraph 13(b), it links the conditions in paragraph
13(b)(1) to the conditions in sub-paragraphs (i)–(v). The AEWC is,
in fact, interpreting the phrase opposite of the phrase’s ordinary
meaning.
While paragraph 13(b)(3) forms the basis for Greenland’s ASW
quota, paragraph 13(b)(1) helps frame paragraph 13(b)(3). As noted
in Section III(C) above, the structure of each exception in paragraph
13(b) is the same. While differences in language are generally read
as intentional, that is not the case here; to treat sub-paragraphs (i)–(ii)
of paragraph 13(b)(1) as additional conditions while treating subparagraphs (i)–(iv) of paragraph 13(b)(3) as independent provisions
would lead to absurd results. In that scenario, the IWC would need to
approve ASW quotas for bowheads in the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort
Seas but not for any of the other stocks subject to ASW. That is
exactly the kind of absurd result that treaty interpreters must avoid. 130
Similarly, paragraph 13(b)(3) cannot be read independently of the
overall structure of paragraph 13(b). It could be argued that the full
stop at the end of paragraph 13(b)(3) permits ASW of the stocks
listed so long as the meat and products are used exclusively for local
consumption. This would mean that paragraph 13(b)(3) is read as
granting permission to conduct ASW unless the sub-paragraphs
13(b)(3)(i)-(iv) contain a quota limiting the hunt. However, this
argument is inconsistent with the overall structure of paragraph
128. AEWC Letter, supra note 28, at 10.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 11, at 39 (May 16) (“[I]t is a cardinal principal of interpretation that
words must be interpreted in the sense which they would normally have in their
context, unless such interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or
absurd.”).
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13(b), which begins, in the chapeau, with the phrase “catch limits are
as follows.” It does not logically follow that if the purpose of
paragraph 13(b) is to set catch limits, then the subsidiary paragraph
sets no limit unless qualified. The quotas set in sub-paragraphs
13(b)(3)(i)-(iv) are a limitation on paragraph 13(b)(3), similar to the
way paragraph 13(b)(1)(i) limits paragraph 13(b)(1). To read this
section otherwise would render the phrase “catch limits are as
follows” superfluous.
The interpretation that paragraph 13(b)(3) is designed to serve the
same purpose as paragraph 13(b)(1) fits better with the structure of
both paragraph 13(b) and paragraph 13 as a whole. Based on logic
and practical application, paragraphs 13(b)(1)-(4) are designed to
serve the same purpose, despite their different drafting.
The conclusions in this section and in section IV(D) below are
supported by the underlying objectives for managing ASW. In 1982,
the IWC agreed on the following objectives for ASW:
(1) To ensure that the risks of extinction to individual stocks are not
seriously increased by subsistence whaling;
(2) To enable aboriginal people, to harvest whales in perpetuity at levels
appropriate to their cultural and nutritional requirements, subject to the
other objectives; and
(3) To maintain the status of whale stocks at or above the level giving the
highest net recruitment and to ensure that stocks below that level are
moved towards it so far as the environment permits. 131

While allowing aboriginal people to meet their cultural and
nutritional requirements is an important objective, that objective is
subject to the other objectives of preventing risks of extinction and
maintaining stocks at the highest level of recruitment. In fact, “the
highest priority shall be accorded to the objective of ensuring that the

131. Aboriginal/Subsistence Whaling, supra note 84, at 84.
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risks of extinction to individual stocks are not seriously increased by
subsistence hunting.” 132
Reading paragraph 13(a) in conjunction with paragraph 13(b) best
fulfills these objectives. Paragraph 13(a) includes the conditions for
ensuring that stocks are not threatened by extinction and maintaining
high levels of recruitment. Paragraph 13(b) ensures that meat is
actually used to meet cultural and nutritional requirements. It further
helps meet the biological goals by ensuring that a quota consistent
with all conditions in paragraphs 13(a) and (b) is approved by the
IWC and inscribed in paragraph 13(b).

D. THE PHRASES “SHALL BE ESTABLISHED” AND “SHALL BE
PERMITTED” DO NOT INDICATE THAT EITHER THE IWC OR AN IWC
MEMBER IS REQUIRED TO ADOPT AN ASW QUOTA
Paragraph 13(a) provides that ASW quotas “shall be established”
and “shall be permitted.” However, these phrases do not create a
requirement that members issue quotas when the IWC fails to do so,
as the AEWC asserts. 133 Rather, the phrase providing that ASW
quotas “shall be established” relates to the phrase at the end of the
same paragraph: “in accordance with the following principles.”
Similarly, the phrase “shall be permitted” relates to the phrase “so
long as total removals do not exceed 90 percent of MSY.” In both
cases, the use of “shall” is linked to the requirement to meet
specified conditions. The AEWC has conveniently ignored the
phrases “in accordance with the following principles” and “so long
as” which link the directive to set quotas with meeting the specified
conditions.
Again, this is consistent with the ordinary meaning of “shall,”
which the Oxford English Dictionary defines, in relation to stating a
necessary condition, as something that “must” happen “if something
else is to happen.” 134 That is, a quota must be established, provided
132. IWC, 45th Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission, at 4243 (1995).
133. AEWC Letter, supra note 28, at 13 (“To comply with the plain language of
the Schedule and the [Whaling Convention Act (WCA)], the Secretary [of
Commerce] must permit aboriginal subsistence whaling and establish numeric
catch limits under the WCA if none are provided in the Schedule.”).
134. Shall Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/177350?rskey=nWMzoy&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited
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that the relevant conditions are met. Taken together, these phrases
demonstrate that the principles enshrined in paragraphs 13(a)(1)-(5)
are necessary to meet the general conditions of paragraph 13(a). It
does not create an independent requirement for members to issue
quotas.
However, the use of “shall” is not superfluous. The IWC must—it
“shall”—establish ASW quotas, provided that such quotas are
consistent with the principles and conditions established in
paragraphs 13(a) and 13(b). If the conditions are met, the IWC may
not refuse to establish a quota.

E. THE USE OF PASSIVE VOICE DOES NOT INDICATE THAT EITHER
THE IWC OR AN IWC MEMBER MAY IMPLEMENT A PROVISION OF
THE ICRW OR THE SCHEDULE
The use of the passive-voice phrase “catch limits . . . shall be
established” does not suggest that either the IWC or an IWC member
may establish an ASW quota, as the AEWC asserts. 135 Specifically,
the AEWC argues that the IWC specifies in the Schedule when it
wants the IWC to undertake an activity by using active voice (“[t]he
Commission shall”) or expressly identifying the Commission as the
body to undertake the activity (“[t]his provision shall be reviewed by
the Commission.”). As a result, according to the AEWC, when the
Schedule does not specifically identify the actor, the Commission
intended either the IWC or an IWC member to implement the
activity. Since paragraph 13 uses passive voice, the AEWC claims
that either the IWC or an IWC member may establish ASW
quotas. 136
However, even a casual read of the Schedule shows the fallacy of
this argument. Paragraph 10, for example, provides that “[a]ll stocks
of whales shall be classified in one of three categories”: Sustained
Management Stock, Initial Management Stock, and Protection
Stock, 137 without identifying who will classify stocks into these
categories. In addition, paragraph 10(e) establishes a moratorium on
commercial whaling. It is perhaps the most important current
Jan. 22, 2015).
135. AEWC Letter, supra note 28, at 8, 9.
136. Id.
137. Schedule, supra note 1, art. III, ¶ 10.
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provision in the Schedule. Yet, while it provides that the moratorium
“will be kept under review,” it does not identify which entity will
conduct the review.
If the views of the AEWC are accepted, each IWC member could
identify whale stocks as falling within one of the three categories. In
this scenario, some members could identify a stock as a Protection
Stock while others could designate it as a Sustained Management
Stock subject to commercial whaling. If the commercial whaling
moratorium is removed, individual IWC members would have
authority to set independent catch limits for all whale stocks except
for the most highly protected category, and could unilaterally
reclassify whales as a Sustained Management Stock (lowest level of
protection). Similarly, either the IWC or each individual IWC
member could review the moratorium, a result that would be
nonsensical. Both of these actions would result in complete chaos
and would negate the purposes of the ICRW to conserve whales and
develop a whaling industry in an orderly manner.

F. THE REQUIREMENT TO ADOPT NATIONAL LEGISLATION IN
PARAGRAPH 13(a)(5) DOES NOT INDICATE THAT ASW QUOTAS
MAY BE UNILATERALLY ADOPTED
Paragraph 13(a)(5) provides that ASW “shall be conducted under
national legislation that accords with this paragraph.” This language
does not suggest that IWC members may conduct ASW unilaterally
without an IWC-approved quota, as the AEWC believes. 138 Rather,
the provision simply states that national legislation is required as part
of the overall ASW management scheme; the IWC may not approve
an ASW quota and an IWC member may not conduct ASW in the
absence of national legislation conforming to paragraph 13.

138. The AEWC argues the following:
Absent a numeric catch limit in the Schedule, it is simply not possible for a
Contracting Government to comply with paragraph 13(a) without establishing a catch
limit through its own national legislation, which of course is precisely what paragraph
13(a)(5) of the Schedule instructs Contracting Governments to do. Without a numeric
catch limit set either at need or at the applicable level to safeguard whale stocks, how
does a Contracting Government meet its obligation to ensure compliance with the
requirements of paragraph 13(a)?

AEWC, supra note 28, at 12.
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Interpreting paragraph 13(a)(5) as a prerequisite to the IWC
approving ASW quotas is consistent with the ordinary meaning of
the provisions in light of its purpose and context. Allowing
individual IWC members to set their own quotas would create
compliance problems with the MSY provisions in 13(a)(1)-(2) by
creating the conditions for a tragedy of the commons where no one
member bears responsibility if its particular quota causes a stock to
slip below MSY levels. Paragraph 13(a) is a comprehensive section
that up to this point has managed all ASW activity. The alternative
interpretation would likely result in failure of any sort of
management scheme.

V. OTHER EVIDENCE SUPPORTING IWCAPPROVED QUOTAS AS A PREREQUISITE TO
ASW HUNTS
Other evidence further suggests agreement and practice among
IWC members and within certain governments that the IWC must
approve ASW quotas before a member may conduct ASW hunts.
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention allows treaties to be
interpreted in light of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice
of the parties. 139 The prevailing view in international law, however, is
that subsequent agreement or subsequent practice may be used to
interpret a treaty only when all parties to the relevant treaty have
subsequently agreed or acted in a particular way. 140 For example, a
WTO panel established in the EC-Biotech 141 dispute concluded that it
139. See Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 31(3)(c). Article 31 provides:
3. There shall be taken into account, together with context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.

Id.
140. See John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and
the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 67-69 (2004) (noting that scholars
and tribunals have stated that “parties” under article 31 of the Vienna Convention
means all parties bound by a treaty, and thus an act by a single party or even a
group of parties is insufficient to establish subsequent agreement or practice for
purposes of treaty interpretation).
141. Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval
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was not required to take into account the Biosafety Protocol to
interpret the WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”) because Argentina,
Canada, and the United States are not parties to the Biosafety
Protocol but are parties to the SPS Agreement. 142 Nonetheless, the
panel stated that it could use the Biosafety Protocol to interpret the
SPS Agreement if it found it informative. 143
Viewed in this light, the evidence described below, including
previous reactions to the IWC’s failure to approve an ASW quota,
likely does not rise to the level of state agreement or state practice
and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶ 4.543, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R,
WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) (adopted Nov. 21, 2006).
142. Id. ¶¶ 7.70–.71, 7.75. Paragraph 7.70 provides the panel’s core conclusion
and reasoning. Paragraphs 7.70 and 7.71 state:
Taking account of the fact that Article 31(3)(c) mandates consideration of other
applicable rules of international law, and that such consideration may prompt a treaty
interpreter to adopt one interpretation rather than another, we think it makes sense to
interpret Article 31(3)(c) as requiring consideration of those rules of international law
which are applicable in the relations between all parties to the treaty which is being
interpreted. Requiring that a treaty be interpreted in the light of other rules of
international law which bind the States parties to the treaty ensures or enhances the
consistency of the rules of international law applicable to these States and thus
contributes to avoiding conflicts between the relevant rules . . . .
[I]t is not apparent why a sovereign State would agree to a mandatory rule of treaty
interpretation which could have as a consequence that the interpretation of a treaty to
which that State is a party is affected by other rules of international law which that
State has decided not to accept.

Id. ¶¶ 7.70-.71.
143. Id. ¶¶ 7.92–.93. The International Law Commission has criticized the
panel’s analysis:
[The EC–Biotech Panel] interpreted article 31(3)(c) so that the treaty to be taken
account of must be one to which all parties to the relevant WTO treaty are parties. This
latter contention makes it practically impossible ever to find a multilateral context
where reference to other multilateral treaties as aids to interpretation under article
31(3)(c) would be allowed. The panel buys what it calls the “consistency” of its
interpretation of the WTO Treaty at the cost of the consistency of the multilateral
treaty system as a whole. It aims to mitigate this consequence by accepting that other
treaties may nevertheless be taken into account as facts elucidating the ordinary
meaning of certain terms in the relevant WTO treaty. This is of course always possible
and, as pointed out above, has been done in the past as well. However, taking “other
treaties” into account as evidence of “ordinary meaning” appears a rather contrived
way of preventing the “clinical isolation” as emphasized by the Appellate Body.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 450, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 8, 2006).
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that must be considered. Nonetheless, the evidence is informative,
which a treaty interpreter could use to help determine the ordinary
meaning of a treaty provision. Further, it can be used to illustrate
how the IWC members have gravitated towards the ordinary
meaning of paragraph 13 discussed in section IV as the most
reasonable interpretation of the ICRW and the Schedule. In addition
to the reactions to past quota rejections, U.S. Department of State
documents, the circumstances surrounding the denial of Greenland’s
quota (including Denmark’s indication that it had to withdraw from
the IWC as a result Greenland’s unauthorized ASW hunt), IWC
resolutions and terms of reference, Greenland’s national legislation
scheme, and U.S court decisions all support interpreting paragraph
13 as requiring the IWC to adopt ASW quotas before ASW may
occur.

A. PAST REJECTIONS OF ASW QUOTAS SUPPORT THE
CONCLUSION THAT IWC-APPROVED ASW QUOTAS ARE REQUIRED
The actions of the United States and other IWC members after the
IWC rejected ASW quotas indicate that they believe the IWC must
approve ASW quotas prior to conducting ASW. For example, in
1977, the IWC suspended the ASW quota for bowhead whales taken
by native people of Alaska (United States) and Chukotka (Russia) in
the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Seas over concerns about the size of
the hunt and its impact on populations, and inadequate surveillance
and enforcement measures to ensure that ASW hunts on bowheads
were in compliance with the ICRW. 144 Rather than engage in ASW
by self-allocating a quota in the absence of an IWC-approved quota,
the United States called a special meeting of the IWC in December
1977 seeking IWC adoption of a quota. 145 Fifteen of the seventeen
IWC members attended the special meeting in 1977, and a vote for a
reduced quota passed with ten in favor, three against, and two
abstaining. 146 Significantly, no IWC members stated that the special
meeting was irrelevant because the United States and Russia could
impose their own quota. To the contrary, all IWC members took their
responsibility to evaluate proposals for ASW quotas seriously,
144. IWC, Chairman’s Report of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting, at 22 (1978)
(noting that five recognized stocks should retain their Protection Stock status).
145. See IWC, Chairman’s Report of the Thirtieth Meeting, at 26 (1979).
146. See id. at 23.
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attended the meeting, and ultimately approved the quota.
Similarly, when the IWC rejected an ASW quota for bowheads
taken by native people of Alaska and Chukotka in the BeringChukchi-Beaufort Seas in 2002, 147 the United States and Russia did
not unilaterally authorize an aboriginal subsistence hunt. Instead, the
United States again called for a special meeting, held in October
2002, at which time the IWC approved a quota. 148
The IWC denied Greenland’s ASW quota request for humpback
whales in 2007 149 and 2008 150 and deferred a decision on the matter
in 2009. 151 That quota was later revisited and approved in 2010. 152 As
with the United States, Greenland did not authorize hunts for
humpback whales between 2007 and 2010.
In both instances when the IWC rejected the bowhead ASW quota,
the United States proceeded by calling a special session of the IWC
and neither the United States nor Russia authorized ASW hunts. This
suggests that, at least as far the bowhead whale stock of the BeringChukchi-Beaufort Seas was concerned, the United States and Russia
recognized that a quota adopted by the IWC was necessary before
ASW hunts could occur. 153 Greenland did not call a special session,
but instead complied with the IWC’s decision by not conducting any
ASW hunts on humpback whales before the IWC approved an ASW
quota at a later meeting. This suggests a common understanding that
147. See generally IWC, Chair’s Report of the 54th Annual Meeting, at 19-22
(2002).
148. See IWC, Chair’s Report of the 55th Annual Meeting, at 14 (2003).
149. See generally IWC, Chair’s Report of the 59th Annual Meeting, at 19-22
(2007) (explaining that Denmark withdrew its request for a quota for humpback
whales because of increasing negative pressure).
150. IWC, Chair’s Report of the 60th Annual Meeting, at 23 (2008) (reporting
that the proposed amendment did not pass because it received twenty-nine votes in
favor, thirty-six against, and two abstentions).
151. Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2010, supra note
14, at 22-23 (finding, however, that the IWC Commission deferred the decision to
an intersessional meeting, that intersessional meeting was not quorate, and the
IWC could not take a decision on the matter); IWC, Chair’s Report of the 61st
Annual Meeting, at 23 (2009).
152. Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2010, supra note
14, at 22-23.
153. See Chair’s Report of the 59th Annual Meeting, supra note 149, at 21
(noting that the United States could not support the requested takes of bowhead
and humpback whales).
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ASW hunts require an IWC-approved quota before they may
proceed.

B. U.S. ACTIONS SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT IWCAPPROVED ASW QUOTAS ARE REQUIRED
The actions of the United States also support the interpretation that
the IWC must approve ASW quotas before ASW may occur. After
the IWC denied the U.S. request for a bowhead quota in 2002, the
U.S. IWC Commissioner Rollie Schmitten told the press that:
In [fifty-six] years of history in the IWC . . . that was the most unjust,
unkind, unfair vote that was ever taken. That vote literally denied people
(the ability) to feed their families . . . . We will leave no stone unturned. It
is so critical that we want to see if we can revive it today . . . .
Governments can play games, but you can’t play with families. 154

Similarly, a State Department spokesperson stated the following
after the IWC failed to approve the bowhead ASW quota:
So we’d like to see the Commission’s decision reconsidered internally or
inter-sessionally, now that the meeting has ended. The International
Whaling Commission could hold a special meeting to reconsider the
quota. It also has procedures, I understand, whereby they could conduct a
postal ballot. So we’ll be looking into options there to try to see that this
quota be approved as it has been for so many years. 155

Clearly, these statements indicate that the United States
understood that the IWC’s rejection of the bowhead quota prevented
ASW on bowheads.
The U.S. view is highlighted in a description of the process for
establishing ASW quotas under U.S. law, in which the United States
writes, “[o]nce the IWC approves a request for an aboriginal
subsistence whaling quota . . . and sets catch limits for each whale
stock in five-year increments, the [U.S. Whaling Convention Act]
provides the mechanism for the U.S. to implement these quotas.” 156
154. Mick Corliss, IWC Meeting Ends in a Bitter Divide, JAPAN TIMES (May
25, 2002), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20020525a3.html.
155. Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman, Remarks at the State Department
Briefing (May 24, 2002), available at http://www.usembassyisrael.org.il/publish/
peace/archives/2002/may/052504.html.
156. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
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The position of the United States is clear: the IWC first approves and
sets quotas and then the United States implements those quotas
through domestic legislation.
In addition, the U.S. Department of State issued a fact sheet
explaining the position of the U.S. government on ASW quotas. In
this statement, the Department of State expressed U.S. support for
quotas for the Alaska Eskimo Whale Commission and the Makah
Indian Tribe of Washington State. 157 The State Department also
explained that the IWC sets quotas by geographical stock, rather than
by country. 158 Management based on regional stocks takes into
account the specific biological needs of the stock and the aggregate
effects of hunts. 159 Management must be able to promote the
endurance of the stock across its entire geographic distribution, and,
to that end, ICRW Contracting Governments have given
management authority to the IWC because it is better positioned to
manage shared resources than individual nations. For this reason, the
IWC does not set quotas on a country-by-country basis, and it is
inappropriate for countries to set quotas of any kind on a unilateral
basis. The U.S. State Department supported this view when it
explained that “[t]he [United States] and Russia allocate the IWC
quotas among the native hunters, so that the limits are not
exceeded.” 160 This language shows that the United States (and
implicitly Russia) understood that they had no right to hunt without a
quota set by the IWC and that IWC members allocate ASW quotas
only after the IWC adopts them. The fact that the U.S. State
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR
ISSUING ANNUAL QUOTAS TO THE ALASKA ESKIMO WHALING COMMISSION FOR A
SUBSISTENCE HUNT ON BOWHEAD WHALES FOR THE YEARS 2008 THROUGH 2012 6
(2008).
157. Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 15, 2002),
http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/10224.htm [hereinafter Aboriginal
Subsistence Whaling-U.S. Dep’t of State].
158. Id.
159. Starting in 1972, proposals began to move Aboriginal Whaling and the
ICRW towards a more ecological approach. This coincided with abandoning the
Blue Whale Unit and introducing species quotas for the Antarctic. In addition,
concern arose that nonmembers operating outside of IWC regulations undermined
effectiveness. See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF WHALING TO CONSERVATION OF WHALES
AND REGULATION OF WHALE WATCHING 425-30 (1985).
160. Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling-U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 157.
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Department raised this issue in conjunction with support for a
renewed ASW quota suggests that the United States viewed denial of
the quota as restricting its ability to issue a unilateral quota.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the IWC denied
Greenland’s quota in 2012 illustrate the reasons for not allowing
IWC members to set ASW quotas unilaterally. Greenland/Denmark
came to the IWC asking for an ASW quota larger than its quota in
previous seasons. 161 It would frustrate IWC management measures
and conservation of whale stocks if the IWC’s rejection of a
proposed increase in a quota allowed the proponent IWC member to
conduct unlimited whaling. If one accepted that argument, then the
IWC would not vote to approve a quota, but rather to limit ASW or,
if it rejected a quota, to remove the quota so that members could
engage in unlimited ASW on that whale stock. Such an interpretation
is absurd. The IWC denied Greenland’s quota request because some
IWC members believed that the proposed quota included an
unacceptable degree of commercialization and was higher than
necessary to meet subsistence needs. 162 These reasons for denying
the quota suggest that the members that voted against the quota
understood that their vote would restrict Greenland’s hunting
activities rather than allow Greenland to hunt unchecked.

C. IWC RESOLUTIONS SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT IWCAPPROVED ASW QUOTAS ARE REQUIRED
IWC resolutions and terms of reference for IWC committees over
an extended period of time support the conclusion that the IWC has
sole authority to set ASW quotas. For example, when the IWC
approved the quota for bowheads in the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort
Seas at the special meeting in 1977, it also passed a resolution that
welcomed improved surveillance and enforcement measures by the
United States that would help “ensure that the number of whales
struck does not exceed the limit established by the [IWC].” 163 By
161. See generally Proposed Schedule Amendment (IWC 64), supra note 31.
162. See IWC, U.K. Comm’r Report, 64th Annual Meeting of the International
Whaling Commission, at 3 (2012), available at http://archive.defra.gov.uk/wildlifepets/wildlife/protect/whales/documents/iwc64-uk-commissioners-report.pdf
(discussing concerns about the need for the increased quotas given that many
investigations that revealed the whale meat was being served to tourists).
163. IWC, Chairman’s Report of the Special Meeting, Tokyo, December 1977,
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focusing the resolution on ensuring U.S. compliance with the IWCapproved limit on ASW, the IWC itself indicated its belief that the
IWC must approve ASW quotas. If the quotas were mere
recommendations, it is unlikely that the IWC would adopt a
resolution focused on “ensuring” that the United States does not
exceed a limit established by the IWC. The language suggests a
broad understanding among IWC members that members must
comply with the IWC-approved ASW quotas. The IWC’s rejection
of a quota is not a license to hunt freely. It naturally follows that
rejection of a requested quota sets the quota at zero, rather than
resulting in no numeric limit on ASW hunts.
At its thirty-fourth meeting in 1982, the IWC passed a resolution
highlighting the importance of cooperation with aboriginal peoples in
ASW management. The resolution stated that “[t]he [IWC] agrees to
manage aboriginal subsistence whaling in accordance with
management principles to be set forth in the Schedule.” 164 This
resolution contains two important points. First, the IWC has agreed
to manage ASW. It seems clear from this language that IWC
members anticipated that the IWC would have sole authority with
regard to ASW. The resolution does not mention individual IWC
members having independent management authority over ASW as an
alternative to IWC management. Unilateral action by IWC members
to adopt and manage ASW quotas unilaterally runs counter to the
purpose of delegating authority to the IWC and undermines the
IWC’s management measures. Just as in the 1977 resolution
concerning ASW for bowheads, the 1982 resolution mentions IWC
management of ASW. This adds strength to the argument that
members have a general understanding that the IWC is the primary
body with authority to manage ASW. Second, the resolution states
that management must be in accordance with the principles set forth
in the Schedule. This recognizes the Schedule as the mechanism for
managing ASW. Taken together, these clauses show that IWC
members understood that the IWC has sole authority to manage
ASW, and that the Schedule is the mechanism by which the IWC
manages ASW. This supports the conclusions reached in Section IV
that the Schedule comprises a comprehensive management scheme
at 4 (1977).
164. IWC 1982 Report, supra note 86, at 39, Appendix 3.
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requiring the IWC to approve ASW quotas, and that IWC members
do not have the authority to set ASW quotas unilaterally.
At its forty-eighth meeting in 1996, the IWC established the
current terms of reference for the IWC’s Aboriginal Subsistence
Whaling Sub-Committee that support the interpretation that the IWC
has primary authority for management of ASW. The terms of
reference state that this Sub-Committee shall consider nutritional,
cultural, and subsistence needs to provide advice to the IWC for “its
consideration and determination of appropriate management
measures.” 165 In this resolution, the IWC acknowledges that it
determines the appropriate ASW management measures. This shows
further recognition of the IWC’s role in setting ASW management,
particularly in setting ASW quotas.
The two resolutions, adopted by consensus, 166 and these terms of
reference constitute multiple declarations over a twenty-year period
in which IWC members have articulated essentially the same thing:
that the IWC is the body that has authority to set ASW quotas. These
statements by the IWC help shed light on the meaning of the
language in the Schedule and help interpret the ICRW. In fact, the
International Court of Justice commented that resolutions, while nonbinding, “may be relevant for the interpretation of the Convention or
its Schedule” when adopted by consensus or unanimous vote 167 and
that parties to a treaty have an obligation to give “due regard” to such
resolutions. 168
165. IWC, Chairman’s Report of the Fiftieth Annual Meeting, at 31 (1998)
(emphasis added).
166. Whether the 1977 resolution relating to bowheads was adopted by
consensus is less clear. The chairman’s report notes that the IWC voted on the
“proposal” to amend the Schedule to include an ASW quota for bowheads. It
further states that the IWC agreed to an additional paragraph to the resolution. It is
not clear whether the “proposal” on which the IWC voted included the resolution
or whether IWC adopted the resolution separately. See IWC 1982 Report, supra
note 86, at 29. Resolutions are adopted by a simple majority and Schedule
amendments by a three-fourths majority, suggesting separate votes for the two
items. However, it is clear that the Schedule amendment and resolution were part
of a package, suggesting that the vote was taken as a single item. Chairman’s
Report of the Special Meeting, supra note 163, at 4.
167. Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan), 2014 I.C.J. 148, ¶ 46 (Mar. 31).
168. Id. ¶¶ 83, 144 (concluding that Japan’s expanded use of lethal methods in
its new Antarctic whaling program, as compared to its previous program, was
“difficult to reconcile with Japan’s obligation to give due regard to IWC
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D. GREENLAND’S NATIONAL LEGISLATION SUPPORTS THE
CONCLUSION THAT IWC-APPROVED ASW QUOTAS ARE REQUIRED
As discussed in Section IV(F), IWC members are required under
paragraph 13(a)(5) to implement the requirements of the ICRW
through national legislation. Greenland implements the ICRW
through an executive order of the Greenland Home Rule
Government. The English translation of the original executive order
provided to the IWC suggests that Greenland recognizes the
necessity of acquiring an ASW quota from the IWC prior to allowing
ASW hunts. The relevant provision requires the government to
consult with the municipal governments and the hunter’s
organization to decide the number of whales that can be taken from
each municipality. 169 It further requires that “[t]he allocated IWC
quotas are the basis of the annual quota.” 170 While this language is
not explicit that the IWC quota restricts Greenland’s hunts, a
contrary interpretation does not make sense: without an allocated
IWC quota, Greenland has nothing on which to base its annual quota.
Greenland’s own implementing legislation is thus consistent with the
view that the IWC must first adopt ASW quotas before an ASW hunt
may be authorized.

E. U.S. COURT CASES SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT IWCAPPROVED ASW QUOTAS ARE REQUIRED
Two U.S. judicial opinions also support the view that only the
IWC may approve ASW quotas. In the wake of the 1977 quota
denial for the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Seas bowhead whale stock,
two lawsuits in U.S. federal courts challenged government decisions
relating to the IWC’s removal of the quota. These cases provide an
independent legal analysis of the obligations of the United States and
insight into how U.S. courts may deal with these issues if the quotas
are ever revoked in the future.

resolutions and Guidelines and its statement that JARPA II uses lethal methods
only to the extent necessary to meet its scientific objectives”).
169. See IWC, White Paper on Management and Utilization of Large Whales in
Greenland, at 76, IWC/64/ASW 7 (June 18, 2012).
170. Id.
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The first case, Hopson v. Kreps, 171 was brought on behalf of
Alaskan Eskimos challenging regulations adopted by the U.S.
government pursuant to the ICRW. Plaintiffs claimed that the IWC
had exceeded its jurisdiction under the ICRW by removing the ASW
provisions and that the Secretary of Commerce had acted illegally by
promulgating the regulations. 172 The Ninth Circuit recognized that “a
major purpose of the Convention was the creation of an international
commission with power to fix [seasonal quotas for the taking of
whales].” 173 The Ninth Circuit also explained that an IWC member
may avoid application of the Schedule by lodging an objection
within ninety days. 174 The court recognized that not only does the
IWC have the power to set quotas, but also that IWC members are
obligated to comply with the Schedule unless they object.
The second case, Adams v. Vance, 175 was a challenge by the
Inupiat Eskimos to the decision of the Secretary of State not to file
an objection to the IWC amendments to the Schedule that removed
the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Seas bowheads from ASW hunts. 176
The D.C. Circuit noted that the United States could avoid application
of the Schedule by making an objection to the decision, but that the
United States chose not to object. 177 The D.C. Circuit recognized that
modification of the Schedule by the IWC amounted to a ban on
whaling that possibly could cause irreparable injury to the
Eskimos. 178 The court is clear that the removal of a quota is a ban on
ASW.
These cases taken together indicate that U.S. federal courts
believed that the United States acted consistently with its legal
obligations under the ICRW by promulgating regulations that halted
171. 622 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1980).
172. Id. at 1377 (“Since Congress enacted the Whaling Convention Act of 1949
solely to implement the Convention, the Commerce Department was not
authorized to adopt Commission regulations that exceeded the scope of the
Commission’s jurisdiction”).
173. Id. at 1376 (citing Hopson v. Kreps, 462 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (D. Alaska
1979)).
174. Id. at 1377.
175. 570 F.2d. 950 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
176. Id. at 952.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 953 (noting that hunts of bowhead after the ban carried with it the
potential for criminal prosecution).
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ASW hunts, and that the United States could avoid these obligations
only by lodging an objection to the Schedule within ninety days.
Further, the courts recognize that the power to set quotas lies with
the IWC and that removal of a quota is equal to a ban. The analysis
of these U.S. federal courts is consistent with and further supports
the ordinary meaning interpretation that only the IWC may approve
ASW quotas.
These two U.S. federal court cases indicate that in 1977, when the
IWC removed the ASW quota for bowheads, the United States
government had the option to object to the amendment to the
Schedule within ninety days. In this situation, the IWC was actually
deleting the reference in the Schedule to aboriginal whaling for
bowhead whales (called right whales at the time).
Whether an IWC member may object to the IWC’s rejection of an
ASW quota depends on whether the Schedule is amended by deleting
the relevant paragraphs of the Schedule. In the case of Greenland’s
quota, the IWC retained paragraph 13(b)(3) with the expired dates,
presuming apparently that Greenland would seek renewal of its quota
at a future IWC meeting. Under these circumstances, Denmark, on
behalf of Greenland, would not have an opportunity to object
because there is no Schedule amendment to object to. If the IWC had
amended the Schedule by deleting paragraph 13(b)(3), then Denmark
would have had the opportunity to object. The objection, however,
would have no practical effect because the IWC must still approve
Greenland’s quota subject to the conditions of paragraphs 13(a) and
(b) of the Schedule. Under either scenario, Greenland would not be
allowed to conduct ASW.
The inability of Denmark to object to the IWC’s rejection of
Greenland’s proposal raises no questions of unfairness because
Denmark and other IWC members had the opportunity to object
when the ASW provisions were adopted. If an IWC member had
wanted to object to the IWC’s authority to approve ASW quotas,
then it should have lodged an objection at that time. When States
enter into international agreements, they exercise their national
sovereignty in ways that may limit their regulatory options. This is a
well-recognized concept in international law. 179 In the case of ASW,
179. Customary law or the State’s consent to be bound by a treaty may restrict
that State’s use of a power within its reserved domain; “no subject is irrevocably
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the ICRW contracting parties have limited their ability to object now
by agreeing to the ASW management scheme found in paragraph 13
and failing to object to it. It is now well established that the IWC has
authority to regulate ASW and, as part of that management scheme,
approve ASW quotas.
This situation is not unique to the ICRW. For example, the parties
to the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”) 180 have developed a regime for
approving sales of African elephant ivory to specific countries. 181 If
the parties reject a proposal to allow trade to a specific country, that
country has no means to make a formal reservation to that decision.
The CITES parties had an opportunity to make a reservation when
the parties amended the CITES Appendices to establish the rules for
trade in African elephant ivory.

VI.THE CONSEQUENCES OF GREENLAND’S
UNAUTHORIZED WHALING
As noted previously, in 2012, the IWC rejected Greenland’s
request for an ASW quota starting with the 2013 season for a number
of reasons. 182 Greenland’s proposal failed to get a three-fourths
majority because some IWC members expressed concerns over the
size of the quota, Greenland’s conversion factors used to calculate
the yield of meat from each whale, and the commercial aspects of the
hunt, including the sale of whale meat in restaurants. 183
Greenland responded first by sending a letter to IWC members
seeking comment on its proposal to establish a unilateral ASW
quota. 184 Members raised several objections to Greenland’s proposal,
fixed within the reserved domain.” BROWNLIE, supra note 116, at 293; see also
BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC LEGAL
SYSTEMS 133 (René Provost trans., 1993) (providing that international law,
whether custom or treaty, acts to restrict the power of sovereign States).
180. See generally Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered
into force July 1, 1975).
181. See id. Appendices I-III.
182. Press Release, supra note 16.
183. See IWC Annual Report 2012, supra note 13, at 21.
184. PS, supra note 21 (reporting that “[t]he Danish government argues that by
setting its own independent quota, Greenland is contravening IWC regulations.”);
Letter from Jens K. Lyberth, Greenland Deputy Minister, Ministry of Fisheries,
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stating, for example, that any ASW quota required approval by the
IWC and that Denmark, on Greenland’s behalf, could submit a new
proposal, which the IWC could vote on by postal vote. 185
Nonetheless, Greenland unilaterally established an ASW quota for
the 2013 and 2014 seasons 186 and allowed the hunt to occur, with
Greenland hunters killing 198 whales in 2013. 187 Greenland’s
unilateral killing of whales set off the next round of legal debate,
with the coalition of countries known as the Buenos Aires Group
arguing that Denmark’s failure to report Greenland’s ASW as
commercial whaling constituted an infraction. 188 Argentina,
supported by Chile, Mexico, and Australia, made the following
statement in the IWC’s Infractions Sub-Committee:
[T]he IWC recognises aboriginal subsistence catches but that a quota for
aboriginal subsistence catches in Greenland for the period 2013 to 2018
was not agreed at IWC64. Therefore it considered that the catches in East
and West Greenland . . . took place without the authorisation of the IWC
and should be reported as infractions according to Article IX of the
Convention. 189

Denmark responded by stating that the catches had been reported as
aboriginal catches, and that “portraying its aboriginal take as an
infraction does not reflect the exceptional circumstances faced by
Denmark, Greenland and the IWC following the last meeting.” 190

Hunting, and Agric., to IWC Comm’rs, Regarding Greenland Quotas on Large
Whales (Dec. 6, 2012) (on file with author).
185. Note Verbale from the Embassy of Brazil in the United Kingdom on
behalf of the Governments of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Mexico and Panama (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://iwc.int/private/
downloads/37bq3ttg9voks0gso0kgkkwgc/IWCCCG1038.pdf; Letter from Donna
Petrachenko to Gitte Hundahl, supra note 22 (objecting to Greenland’s proposal).
186. Whaling in Greenland: Re. Greenland Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling,
GOV’T OF GREENLAND, http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-green
land/Whaling-in-Greenland (last visited Jan. 19, 2015); see also Letter from
Lyberth to IWC Comm’rs, supra note 184.
187. Catches Taken: ASW, supra note 7 (reporting 192 whales killed in East
Greenland and six in West Greenland 2013 and noting that the data for 2014 is not
yet available).
188. See 2014 IWC 65 Meeting in Slovenia, supra note 24.
189. IWC Report of the Infractions Sub-Committee, supra note 32, at 2.
190. Id.
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Denmark further remarked that portraying Greenland’s whaling as an
infraction:
fails to note that all Greenlandic catches are strictly regulated and follow
the advice of the Scientific Committee. Furthermore it does not address
the comprehensive efforts made by Denmark, Greenland to resolve the
issue to be able to continue its work within the IWC nor does it recognise
the subsistence needs of the indigenous people of Greenland. Denmark is,
together with others, working hard to find a carefully balanced solution
which addresses concerns on all sides for the future and is grateful to
those who have participated in the process. 191

Unable to resolve the issue, the Infractions Sub-Committee
forwarded the issue to the IWC. However, the IWC could not resolve
the issue either. Instead, after some discussion, the IWC chair
characterized the issue as an operational issue—“[a] procedural issue
pertaining to Schedule amendments” 192—and referred it to a Finance
and Administrative Committee working group on operational
efficiency and cost saving measures. 193
Labeling Greenland’s activities as an infraction is no small matter.
The ICRW requires all IWC members to take appropriate measures
to punish and prosecute infractions of the Convention. 194 They are
also required to submit full details of each infraction and measures
taken (such as penalties assessed) to address the infraction to the
IWC. 195 If Greenland’s ASW constitutes an infraction, then Denmark
is required to take action against Greenland’s aboriginal whalers and
members of Greenland’s government who authorized such whaling
(neither the IWC nor the Infractions Sub-Committee has the
authority to punish infractions). 196 Resolution of this issue seems to
191. Id.
192. IWC, Summary of Main Outcomes, Decisions and Required Actions from
the 65th Annual Meeting (Initial Draft) (undated) (on file with author).
193. Summary of Main Outcomes, supra note 1.
194. ICRW, supra note 1, art. IX, ¶ (1) (mandating that “Each Contracting
Government shall take appropriate measures”).
195. Id. ¶ (4).
196. IWC Annual Report 2000, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that on one
occasion, the Infractions Sub-Committee appeared to support the position that an
accidental take, such as the incidental catch of a whale in a fishery or the
misidentification of a whale purposefully killed but only after DNA testing found
to be a protected species, should be recorded as infractions “but that normally no
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be much more than a “procedural issue.”
Neither the ICRW nor the IWC has defined “infraction.” As a
consequence, and as illustrated by the debate over whether
Greenland’s ASW in 2013 and 2014 constituted an infraction, the
members accused of infractions deny that an infraction has occurred
or fail to submit relevant information. 197 Some members, such as
Japan, have argued that no infraction has occurred when the action is
not clearly prohibited by the ICRW or its Schedule. 198 St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, which has been granted a small ASW quota for
humpback whales that prohibits the taking of calves, 199 has resisted
attempts to label the killing of small humpbacks as an infraction,
arguing that the definition of “calf” is unclear. 200
According to one analysis, the accused IWC member recognized
alleged infractions as infractions in just ten of forty-six cases from
1991 to 2004. 201 In nineteen cases, the member denied that the
incidents constituted infractions, and in twenty-six cases they failed
to provide additional information even though the Infractions SubCommittee requested the information. 202 One long-time IWC
observer notes that “[o]ver time, members increasingly showed an
unwillingness to cooperate and infractions mostly remained
unpunished” 203 and that the IWC’s handling of infractions is “weak
and ineffective.” 204

penalties are imposed by national governments”).
197. SANDRA ALTHERR, PRO WILDLIFE & OCEAN CARE, NON-COMPLIANCE
WITHIN THE IWC: REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EFFECTIVE IWC COMPLIANCE REVIEW
COMMITTEE 4 (2006).
198. See, e.g., Chair’s Report of the 55th Annual Meeting, supra note 148, at
40.
199. Schedule, supra note 1, art. III, ¶ 13(b)(4).
200. See Chair’s Report of the 52nd Annual Meeting, supra note 15, at 18; see
also WHALE & DOLPHIN CONSERVATION SOC’Y, supra note 15, at 3-4 (reviewing
the history of attempts to label this killing as an infraction).
201. WHALE & DOLPHIN CONSERVATION SOC’Y, supra note 15, at 7; Chair’s
Report of the 55th Annual Meeting, supra note 148, at 39 (highlighting that the
Republic of Korea reported the illegal, deliberate catch of one minke whale by a
Korean national and fined the captain eight million won (about $7,000 US at the
time), revoked the vessel owner’s fishing license, and confiscated the meat and
sold it publicly).
202. WHALE & DOLPHIN CONSERVATION SOC’Y, supra note 15, Annex.
203. ALTHERR, supra note 197, at 4.
204. Id. at 22.
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With respect to Greenland, however, the case is relatively
straightforward and the conduct should be declared an infraction.
Without an IWC-approved quota, Greenland is not authorized to
engage in ASW. In the absence of an IWC-approved quota,
Greenland’s hunt is either commercial whaling in violation of the
moratorium on commercial whaling, included in paragraph 10(e) of
the Schedule, or unauthorized ASW in violation of paragraph 13 of
the Schedule. Whether Denmark reported Greenland’s catch as
commercial or ASW is immaterial; either way, the catch violated
binding provisions of the Schedule and constituted an infraction by
Denmark, the relevant IWC member.

VII. CONCLUSION
With Greenland’s unilateral establishment of an ASW quota and
hunt for the 2013 and 2014 seasons, aboriginal subsistence whaling
joined the moratorium on commercial whaling and Japan’s whaling
for scientific purposes as among the most important and
controversial issues facing the IWC. IWC members have disagreed
over the legal effect of Greenland’s actions. While some argue that
only the IWC may approve ASW quotas and that Greenland’s
subsequent hunt constituted a punishable infraction, others disagree.
Based on an analysis of the ordinary meaning of the ICRW and the
Schedule, this article concludes that only the IWC may approve
ASW quotas and that IWC members may not conduct ASW in the
absence of a quota approved by the IWC. Although paragraph 10 of
the Schedule sets out the general prohibition against killing whales,
paragraph 13 establishes a narrow exception that is only triggered
when all substantive conditions have been met. These conditions
require, among other things, that the IWC adopt a quota for each
season. Consequently, killing whales pursuant to a unilaterally
established ASW quota constitutes an infraction, either for violating
the moratorium on commercial whaling in paragraph 10 or as
unauthorized ASW.
The overall structure of paragraph 13 and the subsidiary
paragraphs create a regulatory scheme that would be undermined if
individual IWC members were able to set their own ASW quotas.
This ordinary meaning interpretation is supported by the actions of
the IWC and its members, Greenland’s implementing legislation,
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U.S. federal court decisions, U.S. Department of State documents,
and the circumstances surrounding the denial of Greenland’s quota.
All of the evidence supports the general understanding among IWC
members that an IWC-approved ASW quota is necessary before a
member may conduct ASW hunts. This evidence has been consistent
over a long period of time and derives from the actions of a number
of IWC members, including the actions of Greenland and the United
States when the IWC denied their requests for ASW quotas. As such,
the IWC’s denial of Greenland’s request for an ASW quota at its
2012 meeting acted as a bar to any ASW activity by Greenland for
the 2013 season and subsequent seasons until the IWC approved an
ASW quota for the relevant stocks. Greenland was not allowed to
establish ASW quotas for 2013 and 2014 unilaterally, as it did. It was
required either to request a special session of the IWC or a postal
vote to gain approval for its quota or submit a request for an ASW
quota at a future meeting of the IWC, which it did in 2014. However,
because it allowed ASW for 2013 and 2014 in the absence of an
IWC-approved quota, Denmark, on Greenland’s behalf, must report
the hunt as an infraction and take appropriate measures to punish and
prosecute those involved in the whaling.

